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THE REGULATION OF REAL ESTATE SYNDICATE
SECURITIES IN CALIFORNIA
The State of California has stringent regulations regarding real
estate securities. This Comment examines these regulations, re-
lated administrative problems, and the resulting decline in the
number of public syndications. A further study is made of the
often elusive non-public exemption to the state regulations. This
Comment concludes by suggesting that the Department df Corpo-
rations should consider less strict and less complex regulations in
view of both the decline in public syndications and the Depart-
ment of Corporations' legislative mandate to promulgate guide-
lines.
INTRODUCTION
Despite the inhibiting effect of the 1976 Tax Reform Act, the use
of limited partnerships as a real estate investment tool continues
to grow.' This continued growth is a result of several characteris-
tics that make the limited partnership attractive to both the syn-
dicator and the investor. First, the limited partnership allows the
investor to contribute capital to a business venture and to share
in the profits without being subjected to unlimited liability.2 Sec-
ond, an investor with only a few thousand dollars may participate
in the purchase of a real estate venture of substantial size. The
small dollar investment permits the investor to diversify the risk
1. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 substantially restricts, and in some cases com-
pletely eliminates, tax benefits previously available to limited partnerships. For
example, the old law allowed the partnership to allocate items of income and de-
ductions to partners in a manner disproportionate to their capital investment ex-
cept when the IRS could show that the major purpose of the allocation was the
avoidance of taxes by the partners. Under the 1976 Act, no such allocation may be
made, unless the taxpayer can establish that the allocation will have a "substan-
tial economic effect." I.R.C. § 704(b). As a result, it will undoubtedly be more diffi-
cult for the partnership to justify a "special allocation." Matsen & Whitesides, The
Basic Securities Law and Tax Aspects of Private Limited Partnership Offerings in
California, 4 W. ST. L. REV. 199, 224 (1977).
2. Syndicators are prohibited from transferring unlimited liability to the lim-
ited partners. 10 CAL. ADnmI. CODE § 260.140.111A (1978).
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of loss by purchasing interests in several syndications or by bal-
ancing his real estate investments with a traditional portfolio of
stocks and bonds. Third, the limited partnership affords investors
the opportunity for professional management. Many persons who
might otherwise purchase real estate hesitate to do so because
they do not have the time or inclination to become experts in
property management and selection, or because they find it
financially difficult to justify professional management in small
projects.
Perhaps the major reason that investors prefer the limited part-
nership over other business forms for real estate investment is
that the profits and losses are passed directly to the partners in
proportion to their interests. 3 This permits the individual part-
ners to shelter income from the syndicate or from other sources. 4
The limited partnership also affords the general partner numer-
ous benefits. For example, he can receive a wide range of fees
from the partnership and the limited partners. These fees include
commissions for selling the program interests, acquisition fees,
compensation for managing the syndicate, additional interest in
the potential profits, real estate commissions on the resale of the
property, and special fees for managing or building the partner-
ship's assets.5
Abuse of this inviting investment device, by inadequate financ-
ing, poor management and deceptive advertisement practices, has
led to a myriad of rules and regulations at both state and federal
levels. Moreover, because the courts consider a limited partner-
ship interest to be a security, it is subject to the stringent laws re-
garding securities. 6 California's regulation of syndicate securities
is the strictest of all fifty states. 7
The comprehensiveness and complexity of the California law
with respect to syndicate securities make it difficult for the syn-
dicator to ascertain exactly what is necessary for compliance with
it. Four problems currently facing syndicators compound the
problem of understanding California law in this area. First, dur-
ing the last ten years, jurisdiction over smaller syndicates has
changed twice. Second, as a result of this change in jurisdiction,
3. See I.R.C. § 704.
4. Comment, SEC Regulation of California Real Estate Syndicates, 61 CALIF.
L. REV. 205, 208 (1973). See Freshman & Forst, Tax and Economic Analysis of Soft
Dollar Syndications, 46 L.A. B. BuLL. 281 (1971).
5. 10 CAL. ADmIN. CODE §§ 260.140.113.1-.6 (1978).
6. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION--CASES AND MATE-
RIAL 308-09 (3d ed. 1972); 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA
SECURITIES LAWS § 5.11[ 2] (rev. ed. 1978).
7. Interview with James Robinson of the law firm of Augustine & Delafleld,
San Diego, California (Sept. 26, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Robinson Interview].
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there has been a corresponding change in the applicable pre-
sumptive standards of fairness. Third, the law governing syndi-
cate securities at times has not been uniformly applied among
different geographical sections of California. Finally, a practice
exists of applying "desk-drawer" regulations, or those which are
not found in any release or rule, but rather reflect informal policy
guidelines.8
This Comment will examine and attempt to clarify the current
state of the California syndicate securities law. Some of the
problems syndicators encounter in attempting to comply with the
California law will also be explored.
BACKGROUND
Prior to December 31, 1977, jurisdiction over real estate limited
partnerships was divided between the Department of Corpora-
tions and the Department of Real Estate. Partnerships with more
than 100 partners were subject under certain circumstances to
rules promulgated by the Commissioner of Corporations,9 while
those with fewer than 100 partners could choose under certain cir-
cumstances to be governed by these rules or by rules formulated
by the Commissioner of Real Estate under the Real Estate Syndi-
cate Act.10
Assembly Bill 983, effective December 31, 1977, repealed the
Real Estate Syndicate Act and placed jurisdiction over small real
estate syndicates under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commis-
sioner of Corporations." As a result, regulation of syndicate se-
curities is now carried out under the Corporate Securities Law of
196812 and the Commissioner's rules.13
The major requirement of these laws is that a security, unless
exempt, must be registered or qualified before any interests can
be sold.14 In addition, the Commissioner of Corporations may re-
fuse to qualify any security if he finds that the issuer's present or
8. Hrusoff, Securities Aspects of Real Estate Partnerships, 11 CAT_ W.L. REV.
425, 429-30 (1975).
9. Van Camp, Securities Regulation of Real Estate Investments: The Califor-
nia Model, 35 OHo ST. L.J. 309, 310 (1974).
10. Ch. 928, § 3, 1969 Cal. Stats. 1855 (repealed 1977).
11. Act of Sept. 22, 1977, ch. 992, 1977 Cal. Stats. See 1 H. MARSH & R. VOLK,
supra note 6, § 31.01[2].
12. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-25804 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978).
13. 10 CAL. ADnu . CODE §§ 260.140.110.1-119.1 (1978).
14. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25102(f), 25110 (West 1977).
proposed course of business is not "fair, just, and equitable."' 5
Pursuant to this authority, the Commissioner has established
standards of presumptive fairness to serve as guidelines to syndi-
cators. Although these standards create only a presumption of
fairness on the part of the syndicate, the syndicate will usually be
deemed fair, just, and equitable when the Commissioner's re-
quirements are met. Although these rules are guidelines, 1 6 not
law, the courts accord great deference to administrative interpre-
tations and decisions and will rarely overrule them.' 7
It should be noted that if the syndicate offering is eligible for
the non-public offering exemption, discussed later in the Com-
ment, the rules regarding substantive fairness do not apply.18
Theoretically, the syndicator is not subject to any regulation by
the Department of Corporations if he qualifies for this exemption.
However, even an apparently exempt syndicator would be well-
advised to follow the Department's general standards of presump-
tive fairness. This practice would assist the syndicator in at-
tracting present and future investors and would also strengthen
his case should the syndicate be found public.
SUBSTANTmVE FAmNEss STANDARDS
The standards of substantive fairness promulgated by the Com-
missioner of Corporations are found in title 10 of the California
Administrative Code.19 They are divided into the following six ar-
eas: (1) suitability of the investor, (2) requirements of the syn-
dicator, (3) fees and compensation, (4) conflicts of interest and
investment restriction, (5) rights and obligations of participants,
and (6) disclosure and marketing requirements. 20
Suitability of the Investor
These rules are designed to ensure that the investor is able to
bear the economic risk of the investment. The investor suitability
standards impose both a net worth and a minimum investment
requirement on the investor. An investor must have a minimum
15. Id. § 25140. The Commissioner may refuse or revoke a qualification if he
finds that it is in the public interest to do so and that the proposed plan of busi-
ness is not fair, just, and equitable, or the securities or the method of issuance
thereof will work a fraud upon the purchaser. Id.
16. 10 CAL. ADum. CODE § 260.140.110.1 (1978).
17. Long, Beyond the Presumptive Standards of the Real Estate Syndicate
Act's Private Offering Exemption, 5 CAL. SYNDIcATOR 9, 10 (1975).
18. CA. CORP. CODE § 25110 (West 1977). However, the syndicator is still sub-
ject to the common-law principles of contract and certain disclosure laws. Id.
19. 10 CAL. ADnmiN. CODE §§ 260.140.110.1-119.1 (1978).
20. Id.
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annual gross income of $20,000 and a net worth of $20,000 (exclu-
sive of home, furnishings, and automobile) or, in the alternative, a
minimum net worth of $75,000 (exclusive of home, furnishings,
and automobile) unless the Commissioner upon receipt of the ap-
plication for registration approves a lower suitability standard.21
In addition, the investor must make a minimum initial cash
purchase of $2,000.22
These rules apparently stem from two unique characteristics of
limited partnerships. First, participants in a limited partnership
do not have the same rights and protections afforded other
investors. Corporate shareholders, for example, possess a vast in-
ventory of rights, remedies, procedures, and guarantees designed
to protect them and their investments. Second, a partnership in-
vestment generally lacks the liquidity afforded a corporate share-
holder. Normally, a partnership interest cannot be readily
converted into cash through the sale or transfer of the interest.23
Requirements for the Syndicator
The syndicator must have at least two years of real estate ex-
perience or other experience which demonstrates that the syn-
dicator has sufficient knowledge to acquire and manage
investment property. 24 If the syndicator or any of his affiliates
provide any services to the partnership, they must have at least
four years of experience in the service being offered.2 5 The syn-
dicator is also required to have a net worth (exclusive of home,
furnishings, and automobile) equal to the greater of $50,000 or five
percent of the gross proceeds of the current offering and of all
other offerings in which the syndicator has acted as general part-
ner during the past twelve months to an aggregate maximum net
21. Id. § 260.140.112.5. Under the Real Estate Commissioner's rules, the syn-
dicator was required to have only an adjusted gross income of $15,000 and a net
worth of $15,000 (exclusive of home, furnishings, and automobile) or, in the alter-
native, a net worth of $30,000 (exclusive of home, furnishings, and automobile). 1
H. MARSH & IL VoLc, supra note 6, § 30.05[3]. For a discussion of investor suitabil-
ity standards, see Comment, Investor Suitability Standards in Real Estate Syndi-
cation: California's Procrustean Bed Approach, 63 CALIF. L REV. 471 (1975).
22. 10 CAL. ADnum. CODE § 260.140.112.4 (1978). Under the Real Estate Com-
missioner's rules, the investor was required only to make a minimum initial cash
purchase of $1,000. Id. § 2995 (repealed 1977).
23. Van Camp, Securities Regulation of Real Estate Investments: The Califor-
nia Model, 35 Omo ST. I.J. 309, 311 (1974).
24. 10 CAT ADNu. CODE § 260.140.111.1 (1978).
25. Id.
worth of the general partner of $1,000,000.26
Fees-Compensation
The Commissioner of Corporations requires the total amount of
the syndicator's or his affiliates' compensation to be reasonable in
light of the nature of the syndicate, the identity of the investors,
and the experience and skills of the syndicator.27 The Commis-
sioner's rules specifically permit the syndicator to receive the fol-
lowing types of compensation: organization and offering expenses,
acquisition fees, program management fees, additional promo-
tional interest, real estate commissions on the resale of the prop-
erty, and a property management fee.28
Compensation for organizational and offering expenses, also re-
ferred to as selling expenses, is limited to fifteen percent of the
initial invested capital.29 In addition, the Department of Corpora-
tions places on acquisition fees an overall limit of eighteen per-
cent of the gross proceeds.3 O Furthermore, the sum of the
purchase price and the acquisition fee may not exceed the ap-
praised value of the investment property.3 1 This sum must be
computed on each individual property and cannot be aggre-
gated.3 2
Arguably, this last requirement unreasonably limits the syn-
dicator's choice of investment property. Undoubtedly, situations
exist in which exceptional properties are passed over because the
purchase price plus the acquisition fee is greater than the ap-
praised value. A better approach may be to calculate the fee on
the total proceeds of the syndicate's properties. The syndicator
would then be able to balance properties with a high appraised
value but a low sales price with properties with a high sales price
but a lower appraised value.3 3
However, strong policy considerations mandate that acquisition
26. Id. § 260.140.111.2. No specific net worth and experience requirements were
imposed on the syndicator under the Real Estate Syndicate Act. See ch. 928, § 3,
1969 Cal. Stats. 1855 (repealed 1977).
27. 10 CAL. ADnm . CODE § 260.140.113.2 (1978).
28. Id. §§ 260.140.113.1-.6.
29. Id. § 260.140.113.2. The Real Estate Commissioner's rules regarding selling
expenses were essentially the same as the Corporations Commissioner's rules.
Id. § 2994 (repealed 1977).
30. Id. § 260.140.113.3(a). The Real Estate Commissioner's rules contained no
overall limit on acquisition fees. Id. §§ 2990-2999.6 (repealed 1977).
31. Id. § 260.140.113.3(d). The Real Estate Commissioner's rules only prohib-
ited the purchase price of the investment property from exceeding the fair market
value of the property. Id. § 2994.5 (repealed 1977).
32. Id. § 260.140.113.5(b).
33. Hrusoff, Securities Aspects of Real Estate Partnerships, 11 CAL. W.L. REV,
425, 462 (1975).
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fees be eliminated altogether and replaced by an increased inter-
est in the profits. 34 By eliminating the syndicator's acquisition
fee, a front-end drain on the resources of the partnership could be
prevented. Such a drain on partnership resources often results in
a cash-flow difficulty.35 The elimination of the syndicator's real
estate commission would reduce the purchase price of the invest-
ment property. 36 Finally, because the syndicator would derive his
compensation strictly from the profits of the program, he would
be more likely to acquire properties that generate a good cash
flow and have potential for appreciation.37
The Commissioner of Corporations also limits the amount of
program-management fees that the syndicator may receive. The
syndicator may take such fees as a subordinated interest or as a
direct fee. Direct fees are permitted only on unimproved land or
on government-subsidized projects.38 The fees on unimproved
land are limited to one-fourth of one percent of the cost of the
land per year;39 those on government-subsidized projects are lim-
ited to one-half of one percent per year.40 All direct fees are lim-
ited to a cumulative total of two percent regardless of the number
of years the land is held.41
The Commissioner permits the syndicator to take a sub-
ordinated interest in the limited partnership as a program man-
agement fee provided that the fee is reasonable. Such fees are
presumptively reasonable if the fee does not exceed twenty-five
percent of the undistributed cash and is subordinated to the re-
turn of 100% of the investors' capital contributions. The fee is
also presumed reasonable if it does not exceed ten percent of the
cash available for distribution plus fifteen percent of the proceeds
from the sale of the syndicate property, both subordinated to the
34. Id. at 461.
35. Id.
36. Id. However, on resale of the property, a third-party broker might still ob-
tain a real estate commission. This commission would ultimately be reflected in
the purchase price.
37. Id.
38. 10 CAL. ADm. CODE § 260.140.113.4 (1978). Under the Real Estate Commis-
sioner's rules, professional management fees for income-producing residential
property could not exceed six percent of the gross receipts. The professional man-
agement fee for non-income producing property could not exceed $100 per month.
1 H. MARSH & R. VoLc, supra note 6, § 30.05[7].
39. 10 CAL. ADNIIN. CODE § 260.140.113.4 (1978).
40. Id.
41. Id.
repayment of the investors' capital contribution with a six percent
cumulative annual return.42
A full real estate commission on the resale of the property is
permitted only if the syndicator did not receive a commission or a
related fee on the acquisition of the property.43 If the syndicator
did take a fee, his commission on the resale of the partnership's
assets is restricted to fifty percent of the original acquisition fee
permitted under the Commissioner's rules.44 These commissions
must also be subordinated to the payment of the investors' contri-
bution with a six percent cumulative annual return on the contri-
bution.45 The Commissioner prohibits the syndicator's use of
exclusive listings for the resale of the syndicate property.46
Conflicts of Interest and Investment Restrictions
Under the Department of Corporations' rules, a limited partner-
ship may not purchase or lease property in which the general
partner has an interest unless the transaction occurs at the for-
mation of the program and is fully disclosed in the prospectus,
the property is sold on terms that are fair to the partnership, and
the cost of the property is clearly established.47 If the partnership
purchases property for a price greater than the cost to the syn-
dicator, the Commissioner of Corporations considers the price un-
fair.48 Consequently, the syndicator is precluded from receiving a
profit in a transaction in which he leases or sells land to the syn-
dicate. However, this rule does not prevent the syndicator from
holding title to the property in order to facilitate the acquisition of
the land so long as no economic benefits accrue to the syndica-
tor.49
The Commissioner also prohibits the partnership from selling
42. Id. § 260.140.113.5(a), (b).
43. Id. § 260.140.113.6.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. § 260.140.114.3. The Department of Real Estate permitted exclusive list-
ings subject only to the examination of three factors: the length of the listing, its
terms, and the appropriateness of such a listing to the type of syndicate being
formed. Id. § 2994(b) (repealed 1977).
47. 10 CAL. ADmiN. CODE § 260.140.114.1(a).
48. Id. § 260.140.114.1(a) (3). Under the Real Estate Commissioner's rules, the
sale to the partnership of property in which a syndicator had an interest was per-
mitted if the price paid by the partnership could be "clearly substantiated" as the
fair market price. Id. § 2994.5 (repealed 1977). This rule seems preferable to the
Department of Corporations' rule because it should not matter from whom the
syndicator receives a profit as long as he is acting openly and fairly. 1 H. MARSi &
R. Votic, supra note 6, § 30.05[1].
49. 10 CAL. ADMw. CODE § 260.140.114.1(a)(4) (1978).
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property to the syndicator.0 Furthermore, the partnership may
not make loans to the syndicator.5 ' Finally, the syndicator is pro-
hibited from acquiring property in return for partnership inter-
ests unless the partnership agreement makes full disclosure of
the transaction, the purchase price is supported by an indepen-
dent appraisal, no more than one-fourth of the interests of the
syndicate are exchanged, and no commissions are paid in connec-
tion with the exchange.5 2
Rights and Obligations of the Participants
The Department of Corporations' rules permit the limited part-
ners holding ten percent or more of the outstanding interests in
the syndicate to call meetings for any reason.53 The rules require
that certain reports be made available to the limited partners and
that limited partners be accorded the right of access to all part-
nership records.5 4 The Department further requires that the lim-
ited partnership agreement provide that the majority of limited
partners in interest may vote to remove the general partner, to
sell or exchange the partnership's assets, to amend the partner-
ship agreement, or to terminate the partnership.5 5
The Department of Corporations' insistence upon majority deci-
sions by the limited partners rather than unanimous decisions
has created a potential conflict between the requirements of the
Department and the demands of the IRS. For a limited partner-
ship to avoid taxation as a corporation, it must not meet more
than two of four corporate characteristics examined by the IRS.56
One of these four characteristics, continuity of life,57 may be af-
fected by the number of limited partners' votes necessary for con-
sent to a continuation of the partnership after removal of the
general partner.
50. Id. § 260.140.114.1(b).
51. Id. § 260.140.114.1(c).
52. Id. § 260.140.114.2.
53. Id. § 260.140.116.1.
54. Id. § 260.140.116.4.
55. Id. § 260.140.116.2.
56. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1) (1979).
57. Id. § 301.7701-2(b) (1). The other three characteristics that the IRS exam-
ines in determining how a liniited partnership is taxed are limited liability, cen-
tralization of management, and free transferability. Id. § 301.7701-2(a) (1). For a
discussion of these characteristics with respect to limited partnerships, see
Stoecklein, 1978 Limited Partnerships ... Taxable as Corporations, CREATIV E
REAL EST. 19.
In Larson v. Commissioner,58 the Tax Court found that two real
estate syndicates lacked the corporate characteristic of continuity
of life. As part of its holding, the Tax Court found that a require-
ment of 100% vote of limited partners to elect a new general part-
ner made the possibility of continuity of life too contingent to
qualify as a corporate characteristic. 59 The majority in Larson
does not address the continuity-of-life question when only a ma-
jority vote of the limited partners is necessary to continue the en-
terprise.60 However, Judge Simpson in dissent argued that there
is no continuity of life even if only a majority vote is required.61
Nonetheless, under the majority view the syndicator may face a
conflict between the demands of the IRS and those of the Com-
missioner's regulations.
The syndicator's tax difficulties are further complicated by the
IRS's position regarding the transferability of interests. The IRS
examines transferability for the purpose of determining whether
a partnership should be taxed as a partnership or as an associa-
tion subject to taxation as a corporation. The IRS's position is
that a limited partnership has the corporate characteristic of free
transferability if the partnership agreement provides that the
general partner's consent for substitution of a partner may not be
unreasonably withheld.62 Similarly, the IRS will find free trans-
ferability if the partnership agreement provides that the general
partner must give his consent to substitution of persons meeting
certain requirements.
Although the Commissioner of Corporations normally requires
that such provisions be included in the partnership agreement, he
currently allows deviations when absolutely necessary for tax
purposes. 63 Such deviations must, however, be supported by an
opinion of counsel.
The Commissioner of Corporations' rules also require that
under certain circumstances the partnership agreement contain
58. 66 T.C. 159 (1976). For an in-depth discussion of the Larson decision, see
Felton, A Larson-Zuckman Checklist for Partnership Tax Classification of ULPA
Real Estate Shelters, 11 U. RICH. L. REv. 743 (1977); Mendenhall & Ferguson, What
Risks Now for Partnership Treatment of Shelters? Lessons of Larson, Zuckman, 45
J. TAX. 66 (1976).
59. 66 T.C. at 175.
60. Interestingly, this question was presented to the Tax Court because
Somis, one of the limited partnerships involved in Larson, did not require a full
100% vote of limited partners to elect a new general partner. Id. at 168. However,
the court resolved the continuity-of-life question with respect to Somis on another
basis.
61. Id. at 201. The Larson decision is marked by two concurring and five dis-
senting opinions, leaving the question far from settled.
62. 1 H. MARsH & R. VoLK, supra note 6, § 31.0515] [b].
63. Id.
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detailed provisions for any future assessments on the limited
partners. 64 For example, in the event of a default in the payment
of assessments, the agreement may not provide for forfeiture of
the defaulting partner's interest. However, a partner's interest
can be proportionately reduced as a result of the default provided
that such reduction is fair.65
Disclosure and Marketing Requirements
The Commissioner of Corporations' advertising regulations are
detailed and elaborate. Generally, "advertising used in the offer
or sale of partnership interests shall conform in all applicable re-
spects to requirements of filing, disclosure and adequacy cur-
rently imposed on ... advertising used in the sale of corporate
securities."6 6 Basically, securities advertising may not be false or
misleading and may not omit any statements necessary to pre-
vent the reader from being misled.67 The Commissioner also re-
stricts the use of certain selling tactics, such as the offer of free
merchandise or trips to visit the syndicate property, as an induce-
ment to participate in the partnership.68 Finally, all advertise-
ments must be filed with the Commissioner at least three days
before publication.69
The Commissioner's rules regarding disclosure are equally
strict. The prospectus must disclose virtually all important as-
pects of the partnership, including: (1) the general nature of the
securities being offered, (2) the risks to be considered before
making an investment in the program, (3) the business expenses
of, and all compensation to, the general partner, (4) the minimum
aggregate amount necessary to initiate the program, (5) provi-
sions for assessments, (6) a description of the investment prop-
erty and of the proposed method of financing, (7) the track record
of the general partner's experience in packaging syndicates, in-
cluding the annual operating results of the syndicator's various
investments, (8) the federal tax consequences of the investment,
and (9) projections of future results, including graphs showing
projected revenues in relation to occupancy levels and expendi-
64. 10 CAL. AD um. CODE § 260.140.116.8 (1978).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 260.140.117.1.
67. CAL CORP. CODE § 25303 (West 1977).
68. 1 H. MARSH &R. VoL, supra note 6, § 31.10[1].
69. 10 CAL ADNum. CODE § 260.140.117.1(b) (1978).
tures. 70
The track-record requirement may be overly harsh when ap-
plied to the small syndicate. The protection afforded the investor
by this comprehensive track-record requirement appears insuffi-
cient to warrant the expense to the small syndicate. A better ap-
proach might be to utilize a different track record for small
syndicates. A small syndicate's basic record would focus on the
general partner's experience and ability to manage and acquire
profitable investment properties rather than on the annual operat-
ing results of diverse types of real estate investments.7 ' This
modification would lessen the expense of providing a track record
for small syndicates and simultaneously would provide investors
with sufficient information on the background of the general part-
ner to enable investors to make an intelligent investment deci-
sion.
The requirement of predicting future results in the real estate
investment is also too harsh when applied to the small syndicate.
The expense involved in the preparation of projections demands a
less exhaustive rule for smaller syndicates. To reduce the cost of
projections, the rules should be modified to require the utilization
of pro forma financial statements rather than the charts and
graphs now required under the Commissioner's rules. 72
Last, the Commissioner of Corporations imposes a legend con-
dition on the syndicator. This condition requires the limited part-
nership interest to state that it may not be transferred without
the Commissioner's consent.73 The purpose of the legend condi-
tion relates to the non-liquid nature of a limited partnership inter-
est and to the possibility that a subsequent transfer may be
unfair to the purchaser.
The Paradox
The strictness and complexity of the Department of Corpora-
tions' rules regarding substantive fairmess have substantially con-
tributed to the sharp drop in the number of public offerings of
70. Id. §§ 260.140.117.1-.3.
71. This was a suggestion made at a meeting in December, 1977, between Wil-
lie Barnes, Commissioner of Corporations, Burton Smith, former Commissioner of
Real Estate, and others representing the real estate industry. This meeting was
part of a study initiated by the Commissioner of Corporations in late 1976. The
study's purpose was to consider changes in the rules as they relate to small syndi-
cations. However, as yet no changes have been effectuated. Interview with Bur-
ton Smith, former Commissioner of Real Estate, in Irvine, California (Sept. 15,
1978).
72. Id.
73. 10 CAT_ ADmnw. CODE § 260.140.118.7 (1978). For a discussion of the legend-
condition requirement, see 1 H. MARsH & R. VoL, supra note 6, § 31.12[7].
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syndicate securities.7 4 In 1970, 165 permits were filed and ninety-
six offerings qualified.75 In 1974, the number dropped to twenty-
eight applications and twelve qualifications.7 6 The year 1977 end-
ed with an even further drop to twenty-seven applications and
seven qualifications. 77
The Department's substantive fairness rules have created an in-
teresting paradox. These rules were promulgated to protect the
investor. However, they may be responsible for syndicators using
the non-public offering exemption and thereby avoiding the re-
quirement of strict compliance with the rules.7 8 This results in
less overall protection for investors.
In light of this situation, the Department of Corporations should
seriously consider revising the substantive fairness rules to make
them less strict and less complex. Furthermore, the Department
should consider applying these rules in a more flexible manner.
In fact, the Department may be exceeding its administrative au-
thority by applying them in such a strict manner. The legislature
has authorized the Department to promulgate only guidelines
with respect to syndicate securities.79 The current application of
the substantive fairness rules seems inconsistent with this legis-
lative mandate.
THE NON-PUBLIC OFFERING EXEMPTION
The Presumptive Standards
The Corporate Securities Law of 196880 provides that if a syndi-
cation does not involve a public offering, it is exempt from regis-
tration.8 1 The Commissioner of Corporations has promulgated
74. Robinson Interview, note 7 supra.
75. Interview with Willie Barnes, Commissioner of Corporations, in Los Ange-
les (Sept. 25, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Barnes Interview]. Although these statis-
tics reflect the trend under the Department of Real Estate, the Department of
Corporations has adopted substantially the same rules. Therefore the statistics
are still persuasive in predicting the future trends of syndicate securities.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
79. CAj CORP. CODE §§ 25000-25804 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978). Section 25016
states that the Commissioner has authority to promulgate "rules" in respect to
syndicate securities. However, this § defines the term "rule" as "any published
regulation or standard of general application issued by the commissioner."
80. Id. §§ 25000-25804.
81. Id. § 25102(a). For a discussion of non-public offerings, see Wertheimer &
rules interpreting the non-public offering.82 An offer of any lim-
ited partnership interest presumptively is not a public offering if
offers are made to no more than twenty-five persons and if sales
are consummated to no more than ten such persons. All the offer-
ees either must have a pre-existing personal or business relation-
ship with the offeror or, by reason of their business or financial
experience, must merit the reasonable assumption that they are
capable of protecting their own interests in the transaction.83
For the purpose of the purchaser rule, a husband and wife act-
ing for themselves or for their minor children are considered one
person.84 Furthermore, a corporation, partnership, or other asso-
ciation is considered a single purchaser unless the entity is
formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the syndicate securi-
ties.85 The purchasers need not be residents of California for the
non-public offering exemption to apply.8 6 Although not men-
tioned in the rules as a prerequisite to qualification for the non-
public offering, the method of offering the interests is also ex-
tremely important. The offering must be on a personal or private
level.87 The use of any advertising in the sale of the syndicate's
interests indicates that the offering is public even if it complies
with the other requisites of the twenty-five and ten "rule."88
Finally, adequate disclosure, though not mentioned in the Com-
missioner's rules, is probably a prerequisite for a non-public offer-
ing.89 In the Commissioner's view, failure to make the disclosures
necessary for investors to make informed investment decisions is
sufficient to make an offering public.90
It is important to note that the twenty-five and ten "rule" is only
a yardstick used to determine the lack of a public offering; it can-
not be used to determine that a public offering exists.9 ' An offer-
ing that does not conform to these standards is not presumed to
Mark, Special Problems of Unregistered Real Estate Securities, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rsv.
1219 (1975).
82. 10 CA . ADni . CODE § 260.102.2 (1978).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Although the Corporations Commissioner's rules do not address this issue,
this is the rule under 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (g) (2) (d) (ii) (1976). This portion of Rule
146 is both logical and reasonable, and the Commissioner and the California courts
would almost certainly follow it.
86. See 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 260.102.2 (1978).




91. 10 CAL ADnmr. CODE § 260.102.2 (1978). The 25 and 10 "rule" is also known
as the "safe harbor" rule.
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be a public offering.92
Beyond the Presumptive Standards
Whether an offering that fails to comply with the twenty-five
and ten "rule" falls within the non-public offering exemption is a
question of fact. Eight components, originating in the Corpora-
tions Commissioner's Relehse 5-C of 196993 and in a 1970 Califor-
nia judicial decision, People v. Humphreys,94 are considered in
this determination. These components are: (1) the number of of-
ferees, (2) the manner of the offering, (3) the size of the offering,
(4) the relationship of the offerees to one another, (5) the rela-
tionship between the syndicator and the offerees, (6) the sophisti-
cation of the investors, (7) the character of the security offered
and issued, and (8) the liquidity of the security.95
Number of Offerees
In Humphreys, the court of appeal stated that the greater the
number of offerees, the more likely the offering is public and, con-
versely, the smaller the number of offerees, the more likely the of-
fering is not public.96 The court further stated that the number of
offerees, rather than the number of ultimate purchasers, is crucial
in determining whether the offering is non-public.97 However, be-
cause the twenty-five and ten "rule" focuses in part on the
number of ultimate purchasers, it seems that the number of pur-
chasers is at least a factor in ascertaining whether the offering is
non-public.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine a numerical bound-
ary between public and non-public offerings. However, one need
not stay within the presumptive numbers of the twenty-five and
ten "rule."98 In the Commissioner's opinion, the number of offer-
ees is not the determining factor in the application of this test.99
Furthermore, one court has found a syndicate comprised of forty-
92. Id.
93. Dep't of Corporations Release 5-C, at 17 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Re-
lease 5-C].
94. 4 Cal. App. 3d 693, 84 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1970).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 698, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
97. Id.
98. 10 CAL ADmN. CODE § 260.102.2 (1978).
99. Barnes Interview, note 75 supra.
six investors to be non-public.O0 Nevertheless, as the number of
offerees increases, a greater likelihood exists that the offering will
be found to be public. Moreover, at some point the offering will
be considered public regardless of the fact that other factors tend
to show that the offering is non-public.' 0 '
Manner of the Offering
Both Release 5-C and the court in Humphreys declare that the
manner in which an offering is conducted is a particularly signifi-
cant factor in determining whether the offering is public or non-
public.10 2 The Department's position is clear: The use of seminars
or public meetings constitutes strong evidence of a public offer-
ing. 03 Interests should not be indiscriminately offered to a heter-
ogeneous group; rather, interests should be offered to a group
carefully screened to reflect the required suitability standards. If
the syndicator lacks ready access to his friends and business as-
sociates, he may be tempted to resort to various devices to bring
offerees together. However, the syndicator should avoid such ac-
tion because the offering may ultimately be found to be public.
The Department of Corporations also scrutinizes the initiative
for purchasing syndicate interests. If the initiative originates with
the syndicator, it constitutes evidence of a public offering. An of-
fer induced by the offeree, on the other hand, is evidence of a
non-public offering.104
Of continuing concern to attorneys are the Commissioner's dec-
larations that the use of a broker-dealer strongly supports the
conclusion that the syndicate is public.O5 Because many syndica-
tors use broker-dealers, the Commissioner's enforcement of this
opinion would have a drastic effect upon non-public offerings. Al-
though important, the declarations of the Commissioner are only
opinions and not the law. The use of broker-dealers may be a
strong factor in a Department investigation, as long as the syn-
dicator meets the other requirements of a non-public offering, but
100. Camerini v. Long, 184 Cal. App. 2d 292, 294, 8 Cal. Rptr. 174, 175 (1960). It
should be noted that Camerini was decided before the enactment of the 25 and 10
"rule." Therefore, it is somewhat unclear whether it would be followed today.
101. Note, The Availability to the Syndicator of the Private Offering Exemption
to the California Corporate Securities Law, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 792, 795 (1966).
102. People v. Humphreys, 4 Cal. App. 3d 693, 699, 84 Cal. Rptr. 496, 499 (1970);
Release 5-C, supra note 96, at 17, 21.
103. Long, supra note 17, at 12.
104. Release 5-C, supra note 92, at 21.
105. See, e.g., Dep't of Corporations, State of California, Commissioner's Opin-
ion No. 74/86C (Sept. 3, 1974); id. 74/69C (June 19, 1974); id. 74/57C (May 23, 1974);
id. 73/38C (Mar. 13, 1973).
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the broker-dealer factor probably will not be determinative.1 0 6
The syndicator's use of in-house broker-dealers rather than com-
mercial brokerage firms would no doubt be to his advantage in a
Department investigation.
Size of the Offering
The size of the offering is another factor the Commissioner and
the courts consider in determining whether the offering is public
or non-public. 0 7 Size refers to both the dollar amount of the of-
fering and the number of syndicate interests. Release 5-C states
that an offering consisting of only a limited number of syndicate
interests is less likely to be considered a public offering than one
consisting of a large number of interests. 08 The release further
states that even if the number of interests is small, if they can be
converted into a larger number of interests, the larger number
will be determinative. 09
Size is probably the least important component. The Commis-
sioner has stated that the dollar amount of the offering alone will
rarely cause the syndicate to lose its non-public exemption."10
However, although the dollar amount by itself may not create a
public offering, the Commissioner may combine the dollar
amount with the other factors and thereby find a public offering.
The syndicator probably will have difficulty with the size of the
offering only when the Commissioner finds that the offering is
part of an "integrated"" series of offerings.
106. Robinson Interview, note 7 supra.
107. People v. Humphreys, 4 Cal. App. 3d 693, 697, 84 Cal. Rptr. 496, 498 (1970);
Release 5-C, supra note 92, at 17, 20.
108. Release 5-C, supra note 92, at 20.
109. Id. at 21.
110. Barnes Interview, note 75 supra.
111. See Comment, SEC Regulation of California Real Estate Syndicates, 61
CALIF. L. REV. 205, 221 (1973). An offering will be "integrated" when it is actually a
part of a larger syndication or offering. Factors relevant to the determination of
whether a purportedly private offering should be integrated are: (1) whether the
different offerings are part of a single plan of financing, (2) whether the offerings
involve the same class of security, (3) whether the offerings are made at or about
the same time, (4) whether the offerings are made for the same type of considera-
tion, and (5) whether the offerings are made for the same general purpose. 17
Rule 146 C.F.R. § 230.146 (preliminary note 3) (1976). For a discussion of the doc-
trine of integration, see Comment, Application of the Securities Doctrine of Inte-
gration to Real Estate Syndicates, 46 S. CAL L. REV. 428 (1973).
Relationship of the Offerees to Each Other
Humphreys and Release 5-C provide that a pre-existing rela-
tionship among members of the group to which the offering is
made may be significant in determining whether the offering is
non-public in nature.112 An offering to more than twenty-five per-
sons may still be non-public so long as there is a close relation-
ship of blood, friendship, or business association among the
members of the group.113
The relationship among the offerees, however, is only one factor
in determining whether the offering is non-public. In SEC v. Ral-
ston Purina Co.,14 the United States Supreme Court found that
although all the offerees were employees of the same company,
this relationship was not decisive when inadequate information
was available to the offerees."15
The Department of Corporations, with respect to non-public of-
ferings, follows the same standards as the federal courts.1 6 At
the same time, however, the state courts are not bound by the
federal decisions and may reach different conclusions regarding
the non-public offering exemption. Nevertheless, it is likely that
the Commissioner and the California courts would follow the Ral-
ston Purina decision.
Relationship Between the Offerees and the Syndicator
Humphreys and Release 5-C state that a close business or per-
sonal relationship between the syndicator and the investors is in-
dicative of a non-public offering. 1 7 The leading case on this point
is SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co. of South Carolina, Inc.118 In
Continental Tobacco, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the violation of this component alone can cause a pro-
gram to be public.119
The Department of Real Estate also placed considerable em-
phasis on this, component when it had jurisdiction over limited
partnerships. The Department of Real Estate thought that if the
112. People v. Humphreys, 4 Cal. App. 3d 693, 697, 84 Cal. Rptr. 496, 498 (1970);
Release 5-C, supra note 92, at 17, 19.
113. Dep't of Corporations, State of California, Commissioner's Opinion No. 67-5
(May 27, 1967).
114. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
115. Id.
116. Barnes Interview, note 75 supra.
117. People v. Humphreys, 4 Cal. App. 3d 693, 697, 84 Cal. Rptr. 496, 498 (1970);
Release 5-C, supra note 92, at 20.
118. 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972). Although this landmark case was decided
under federal securities law, the court's reasoning is still applicable to California
securities law.
119. Id.
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investors were not close to the syndicator, "[d]ue to natural
human hesitancy on their part... [they would] not avail them-
selves of the kind of information necessary to critically evaluate
the investment." 20
Although the Commissioner of Corporations would most likely
give substantial weight to this component, failure to satisfy this
component apparently would not, in and of itself, cause the offer-
ing to be deemed public under the Commissioner's rule. As men-
tioned previously,' 21 the Commissioner requires as a condition
precedent of a presumptive non-public offering either that the of-
ferees have a pre-existing personal or business relationship with
the syndicator or that the offerees can reasonably be assumed ca-
pable of protecting their own interests in the transaction by rea-
son of their business or financial experience.
In many limited partnerships, the syndicator has a close rela-
tionship with a broker-dealer, and the broker-dealer has a close
relationship with the offerees, but the offerees do not have a close
relationship with the syndicator. This latter fact, in the eyes of
the Department, may be evidence of a public offering. 22
Sophistication of the Investors
The most important component in determining whether an offer
is public or non-public is whether the offerees are, by reason of
their business or financial experience, capable of defending their
interests in the real estate transaction. 23 In concluding that
there was an offering to the public, the Humphreys court stated
that "[i]t would appear that the offerees, as a class, were the type
who needed the protection of the Corporate Securities Law." 24
There is considerable disagreement regarding the kind of busi-
ness experience required before a person no longer needs the
protection of the state. 25 The federal courts view "sophistication"
as a general concept. The federal decisions focus on whether the
offeree knew what to look for and how to interpret the available
120. Long, supra note 17, at 15.
121. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
122. Robinson Interview, note 7 supra.
123. People v. Humphreys, 4 Cal. App. 3d 693, 697, 84 Cal. Rptr. 496, 498 (1970).
124. Id. at 701, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
125. For one view on the issue of "paternalism versus non-paternalism," see
Wang, The California Statutory Close Corporation: Gateway to Flexibility or Trap
for the Unwary?, 15 SAN DIEGO L REV. 687, 746-47 (1978).
information regarding the syndicator's business and his potential
profits.126 The Department of Real Estate, on the other hand, felt
that the best measure of sophistication was prior investment ex-
perience in the particular type of business being syndicated.127
The Commissioner of Corporations' treatment of sophistication
will most likely parallel the approach of the Department of Real
Estate.128
The Department of Corporations and the federal courts also dis-
agree on the effect that assistance of counsel should have on the
determination of sophistication. One federal court held that the
sophistication component is satisfied when the offerees have the
assistance of counsel. 29 Although it is a good practice for the
syndicator to require the offerees to seek the advice of indepen-
dent counsel, the Commissioner of Corporations has indicated
that the use of counsel will not in itself satisfy the sophistication
requirement.130 The offerees themselves must have the requisite
knowledge and understanding with respect to the particular in-
vestment.
In attempting to satisfy the sophistication requirement, some
syndicators have had investors execute letters stating that they
are experienced and are in a high tax bracket. However, this ploy
is inconclusive on the question of whether "the particular class of
persons affected need [sic] the protection of the Act."31
Character of the Security Offered and Issued
The Commissioner of Corporations states in Release 5-C that
"[s] ince some types of securities are more familiar or attractive to
the investing public than others, the character of the security has
a bearing on the question whether the offering is to the public."' 32
The use of a highly tax-structured limited partnership, rather
than stocks or bonds that may be traded on a public market, will
be evidence of a non-public offering.133 Moreover, the more the
syndicator's offering resembles securities commonly in circula-
126. Bowers v. Columbia Gen. Corp., 336 F. Supp. 609, 624 (D. Del. 1971).
127. Long, supra note 17, at 15.
128. The Commissioner's treatment of a non-public offering is substantially the
same as that of the Department of Real Estate. Barnes Interview, note 75 supra.
Because sophistication is a factor in qualifying a non-public offering, it follows that
the Commissioner of Corporations and the Department of Real Estate would take
similar approaches to the sophistication issue.
129. Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-66 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 91,523 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
130. Barnes Interview, note 75 supra.
131. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137, 158 (5th Cir. 1972).
132. Release 5-C, supra note 92, at 22.
133. Id.
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tion, the more likely it will be considered a public offering. 3 4
Limited partnership agreements usually contain a provision giv-
ing partners the right to have their interests redeemed by the
general partner or purchased by the other partners on a first-re-
fusal basis.135 The underlying reason for this clause is to provide
some liquidity for the limited partners. However, the syndicator
should be careful in utilizing this right of first refusal because it
will make the offering more similar to securities commonly in cir-
culation and thus indicative of a public offering.13 6
Liquidity of the Security
The Humphreys court added the liquidity of the security as the
last of the eight components. It held that "[t] he more readily the
transfer may be made, the more likely [it will] be deemed pub-
lic."137 Furthermore, one federal court has held that the private
offering exemption under the federal securities laws may be lost
as a result of the facts surrounding the resale, especially if there
is inadequate disclosure of the material facts. 38
A useful procedure is to have the investors provide letters of in-
tent confirming that they have not purchased the securities for
the purpose of reselling them. The syndicator may also include
various transfer restrictions in the limited partnership agreement,
such as high transfer fees as a condition of assignment, to mini-
mize the liquidity of the syndicate security.139
Although the Department may take this eighth component into
account in determining the presence of a non-public offering, it is
probably a relatively unimportant factor. The Commissioner has
stated that he does not place a great deal of emphasis on this
eighth component. 140
Tomei v. Fairline Feeding Corp.
In addition to the components noted above, the case of Tomei v.
Fairline Feeding Corp.141 merits special mention. In Tomei, the
134. People v. Humphreys, 4 Cal. App. 3d 693, 701, 84 Cal. Rptr. 496, 500 (1970).
135. Long, supra note 17, at 18.
136. Id.
137. 4 Cal. App. 3d 693, 701, 84 Cal. Rptr. 496, 500 (1970).
138. SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485, 490 (2d Cir. 1960).
139. Long, supra note 17, at 18.
140. Barnes Interview, note 75 supra.
141. 67 Cal. App. 3d 394, 137 Cal. Rptr. 656 (1977).
court held that an issuer's previous packaging of public offerings
is evidence that the present offering is public.142 Furthermore,
the decision contains language that might be interpreted to mean
that offers are non-public only if they are offered to no more than
twenty-five offerees and sold to no more than ten investors.143
However, as previously discussed,14 the twenty-five and ten
"rule" is not exclusive but provides only a yardstick for offerings
conforming to the limits set forth within it.145 Furthermore, the
question of whether the offering was public or non-public was not
directly at issue in Tomei. Thus, the court's decision should not
be determinative on the issue of the twenty-five and ten "rule."
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Several practical problems regarding the administration of the
syndicate securities rules should be highlighted. A major com-
plaint of attorneys concerns the Department of Corporations' in-
flexibility in dealing with differences between syndicates. One
attorney related an incident in which a limited partnership agree-
ment called for a subordinated three-fourths of one percent of the
sales price as compensation for the syndicator upon the resale of
the property. The Department rejected this method of calculating
compensation on the basis that the compensation had to be in the
form permitted by the Commissioner's rules. A few computations
reveal that the land would have had to appreciate 600% before the
three-fourths percent would have been greater than the amount
permitted under the Commissioner's rules.146 This type of inflexi-
bility does not afford any more protection for the investor and im-
poses unnecessary restraints on the syndicator.
The Department of Corporations should apply its rules in a
more flexible manner. The Department could substantially
achieve this objective if its application of the rules were consis-
tent with their intended nature as guidelines rather than as strict
rules.
Another problem facing attorneys and syndicators is the lack of
uniformity in the Department's decisions. Both "desk drawer"147
regulations and the geographically inconsistent application of the
rules contribute to this situation. An example of the lack of uni-
formity was noted at a meeting between the Commissioner of
142. Id. at 401, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
143. Id.
144. See text accompanying notes 91-92 supra.
145. 10 CAT ADmi. CODE § 260.102.2 (1978).
146. Robinson Interview, note 7 supra.
147. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
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Corporations and several representatives of the real estate indus-
try. 48 In the course of the discussion, it was discovered that a
particular type of syndicate was systematically rejected in San
Diego while an identical syndicate had been approved in Oak-
land.1 49 Fortunately for syndicators, the present Commissioner of
Corporations has made the elimination of "desk-drawer" regula-
tions one of his top priorities.150
A closer working relationship between the Commissioner and
his deputies could greatly alleviate the problem of uniformity.
Better communication would ensure that the deputies' perfor-
mance of their duties is consistent with the Commissioner's
views.
A third problem complicating the syndicator's efforts in comply-
ing with the Department's rules is the natural hesitancy on the
part of attorneys and syndicators alike to question the decisions
of the local deputy. Many feel that a challenge to the deputy's de-
cisions might impair their relationship with him and make it more
difficult to qualify their syndicates in the future. 5 1 As a result,
one finds "regulation by fiat";'5 2 that is, a deputy may do as he
wishes without fear that his decisions will be challenged.
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PENALTIES
It is extremely important that the syndicator understand the
rules and regulations of the Department of Corporations with re-
spect to both public and non-public offerings. Failure to comply
with the rules discussed above can subject the syndicator to both
criminal and civil penalties under California law.' 53
The California legislature has imposed criminal penalties for
the willful violation of any provision of the syndicate securities
laws. Any person who willfully violates these laws is subject-to a
fine of not more than $10,000 and imprisonment for not more than
one year.154
148. This meeting took place on December 30, 1977. Those present discussed
possible changes in the Commissioner's rules with respect to smaller syndicates.
Interview with Burton Smith, former Commissioner of Real Estate, in Irvine, Cali-
fornia (Sept. 15, 1978).
149. Robinson Interview, note 7 supra.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. Mr. Smith used the term "regulation by fiat" during the interview.
153. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25503, 25540 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978).
154. Id. § 25540 (West Supp. 1978).
The syndication is also subject to various civil penalties for fail-
ure to comply with the syndicate securities laws. If the syndica-
tor violates any provision of the syndicate securities laws
pertaining to the qualification and/or the registration of a syndi-
cate security, the investor is entitled to rescind the transaction
and to recover the consideration paid for the security plus inter-
est thereon less any income received therefrom. 155 Alternatively,
the investor may sue the seller for the difference between the
consideration received by the seller and the value of the security
at the time the investor purchased the security.15s
CONCLUSION
This Comment illuminates the requirements for real estate syn-
dicates under California rules and regulations and the difficulties
encountered by attorneys and syndicators in attempting to com-
ply with them.
The comprehensiveness and strictness of the Department of
Corporations' rules regarding substantive fairness make compli-
ance extremely difficult for the syndicator. In addition, the syn-
dicator faces various administrative problems, such as the lack of
uniformity and flexibility in the application of the Department's
rules and "regulation by fiat," in attempting to comply with the
substantive fairness rules.
Thus, one finds a paradox. The substantive fairness rules were
formulated to protect the investor. However, because of their
strictness and complexity, the rules have been at least partially
responsible for syndicators going non-public and thereby avoiding
strict compliance with the rules. As a result, investors receive
less protection. In light of these circumstances, the Department
of Corporations should consider revising the substantive fairness
rules in order to make them less strict and less complex. Further-
more, it should apply these rules in a more flexible manner. Such
a course of action would be consistent with the Department's ad-
ministrative authority-the promulgation of guidelines regarding
syndicate securities.
BuIL NAUMANN
155. Id. § 25503 (West 1977).
156. Id.
